Valuation of Rescheduled Loans, 1978-1983: A Rational Expectations Approach by Sule Ozler
VALUATION  OF RESCHEDULF.D  LOANS,  1978-1983: 
A  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS APPROACH 
bY 
Sule  dzler 
University  of  California,  Los  Angeles 
UCLA Department  of  Economics 
Working  Paper  #414 
August  1986 
Revised:  February  1987 ABSTRACT 
The  impact  of  LDC  loan  reschedulings  on  the  major  U.S.  banks  and  their 
implications  for  LDC  financing  has  been  of  interest  since  the  onset  of  the 
Mexican  crisis.  This  paper  presents  an  empirical  model  that  calculates  the 
unanticipated  revaluation  of  bank  assets  in  response  to  news  regarding 
reschedulings.  The  model  incorporates  expectation  formation  and  hence, 
unlike  a  standard  event  study  methodology,  provides  a  means  of  computing 
probability  of  default  of  rescheduled  loans.  The  nine  largest  U.S.  banks 
are  estimated  to  suffer  8.2  percent  of  their  stock  returns  during  1981-1983 
when  the  default  probability  was  approximately  two  percent.  We also  show 
that  these  loans  have  a  significant  systematically  risky  component. 1 
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I.  Introduction 
Over  the  last  decade,  commercial  banks  have  evidently  become  quite 
vulnerable  to  the  payment  problems  of  developing  countries.  The  ratio  of 
claims  on  developing  countries  to  capital  of  U.S.  banks  reached  a  high  of 
198.8%  in  1981.  1  During  the  same  period,  the  number  of  countries  which 
failed  to  make  timely  payment  on  outstanding  debt  showed  a  marked  increase. 
Typically,  such  failures  have  led  to  negotiations  over  the  terms  of  credit. 
Successful  negotiations  culminated  in  rescheduling  agreements.  The  amount 
of  rescheduled  bank  debt  dramatically  increased  to  $62  billion  in  1983  from 
its  annual  average  of  $1.5  billion  during  the  1978-81  period.  2 
During  the  1978-83  period,  the  spreads  on  rescheduled  loans  have 
typically  been  higher  than  the  spreads  on  new  loans.  Despite  these  higher 
spreads,  an  increased  number  of  reschedulings  raised  concerns  regarding 
their  implications  for  the  banking  industry.  Have  the  spreads  on 
rescheduled  loans  reflected  the  market's  assessment  of  the  risk  of  these 
loans?  What  was  the  probability  of  payment  assigned  by  the  market  to 
rescheduled  loans?  Did  these  loans  have  a  significant  systematically  risky 
component? 
Systematic  study  of  the  effects  of  reschedulings  on  banks  has  been 
limited,  despite  the  increased  occurrence  of  reschedulings  during  the  last 2 
decade.  Investigators  have  previously  conducted  two  types  of  analyses.  One 
approach  has  been  to  examine  the  relationship  between  bank  exposure  to 
developing  countries  and  bank  stock  prices  (Kyle  and  Sachs  (1984)).  Since 
measures  of  exposure  contain  virtually  no  information  on  reschedulings,  this 
methodology  is  inadequate  to  address  all  the  questions  posed  above.  Another 
line  of  research  measures  the  impact  of  actual  announcements  of  reschedul- 
ings  (6zler  (1986),  for  1978-83  reschedulings;  Schoder  and  Vandurke  (1986); 
Cornell  and  Shapiro  (1986);  Bruner  and  Simms  (1987)  for  the  Mexican  crisis 
of  1982).  These  studies,  however,  are  susceptible  to  errors  stemming  from 
the  defects  inherent  in  the  standard  event  study  methodology.  Specifically, 
by  restricting  attention  to  certain  types  of  events,  relevant  information 
which  would  influence  the  formation  of  expectations  is  omitted.  Nor  does 
this  approach  provide  a  means  of  computing  the  expected  probabilities  of 
nonpayment;  it  only  produces  an  estimate  of  the  net  effect  of  reschedulings. 
In  this  paper  we  develop  and  implement  a  method  to  provide  answers  to 
the  questions  raised  by  reschedulings.  For  this  purpose  the  stock  price 
behavior  of  banks  is  investigated  in  greater  detail.  We assume  that 
financial  markets  are  efficient,  because  the  evidence  supporting  it  has  been 
quite  strong  (Fama  1970).  Efficient  market  theory  implies  that  security 
prices  in  a  capital  market  reflect  all  available  information.  Therefore 
only  when  new  information  emerges  will  security  prices  differ  from  the 
market  equilibrium  price.  This  distinction  between  unanticipated  and 
anticipated  changes  in  variables  has  also  been  an  important  feature  of 
empirical  work  in  macroeconomics  (for  example,  Barro  (1977,  1978)). 
Accordingly,  we  have  constructed  an  empirical  model  of  the  rescheduling 
process.  In  this  model,  the  expected  value  of  international  loans  is 
calculated  periodically  by  estimating  both  the  probabilities  of  loan 3 
reschedulings  and  the  conditional  values  of  those  loans.  In  estimating 
probabilities  we  follow  similar  methods  to  those  in  the  "country  risk" 
literature  (surveyed  in  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1985)  and  McDonald  (1982)). 
Changes  in  these  expected  values  from  one  period  to  the  next  are  associated 
with  the  revelation  of  new  information  during  that  period.  We then  assume 
that  the  market  forms  its  rational  expectations  according  to  this  model,  and 
extimate  the  response  of  bank  stock  price  returns  to  unanticipated  changes. 
A  knowledge  of  the  fraction  of  changes  that  are  capitalized  in  stock  returns 
permits  the  calculation  of  the  average  nonpayment  probability  of  rescheduled 
loans  assigned  by  the  market.  The  capitalized  fraction  is  additionally  of 
interest  because  it  provides  insight  into  the  competitiveness  and  efficiency 
of  the  international  banking  market. 
In  constructing  the  empirical  model  of  the  rescheduling  process, 
monthly  data  on  forty  eight  countries  between  1975  and  1983  have  been 
employed.  We then  investigated  the  monthly  behavior  of  large  U.S.  bank 
stock  returns  during  the  1978-1983  period.  Our  results  indicate  that  the 
stock  returns  of  the  largest  nine  U.S.  banks  fell  by  six  percent  due  to  loan 
reschedulings  alone.  Futhermore,  we  find  a  structural  change  when  the  1978- 
1980  and  1981-1983  periods  are  compared.  In  the  earlier  period  no 
statistically  significant  impact  of  reschedulings  on  stock  prices  is  found. 
In  the  later  period,  the  decline  of  the  top  nine  banks'  stock  returns  is 
estimated  to  be  8.2  percent.  Correspondingly,  the  probability  of  non- 
payment  of  rescheduled  loans  is  found  to  be  nearly  two  percent.  We also 
show  that  the  systematically  risky  component  of  these  loans  is  very 
significant. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Sections  II  and  III  develop  the 
conceptual  framework  and  the  empirical  specifications  respectively:  Section 4 
IV  presents  the  results.  A  summary  of  the  conclusions  is  contained  in 
Section  V. 
II.  Bank  Stock  Prices  and  Value  of  Loans 
A.  Bank  Stock  Returns  and  New  Information 
The  capital  market  efficiency  assumption  implies  that  the  pricing  of 
stocks  incorporates  all  available  information.  New  information  is  reflected 
in  the  movement  of  stock  prices.  By  defining  a  function  which  maps  new 
information  from  different  sources,  such  as  those  related  to  the  reschedu- 
ling  process  of  international  loans,  onto  the  changes  in  the  stock  prices  of 
banks,  we  decompose  the  unexpected  movements  of  stock  prices. 
It  is  first  assumed  that  the  capital  asset  pricing  model  characterized 
in  the  following  equation  holds  (see  Black  (1972)): 




=  stock  price  return  of  bank  j  at  time 
14,)  + Bj [E(Rmt  14,) -  E(Rztbt)l  7  (1) 
t, 
R  zt  =  return  on  an  asset  whose  returns  are  uncorrelated  with  R 
mt  at 
time  t, 
R  mt  =  return  on  the  market  portfolio  at  time  t, 
5 
-  relative  risk  of  bank  j, 
4t  =  the  information  set  at  time  t,  and 
E  =  expectations  operator. 
Let  E(Rmt14t)  =  Rmt  -  crnt9  and  E(Rjtl4t)  =  R. 
Jt  -  'jt  where  e  mt  and 
'jt  are  random  variables  with  zero  expected  values.  Assuming  that  a  risk- 
free  asset  exists,  and  that  investors  borrow  and  lend  at  the  single  risk- 
free  rate,  equation  (1)  can  now  be  rewritten  as: 
R. 
Jt 
=R  zt  +  B-CR  J  mt-RZt)  -  crnt  +  E.  . 
Jt 
(2) 5 
If  capital  markets  are  efficient,  'jt  is  the  ratio  of  the  change  in 
the  firm's  value  from  information  released  at  time  t  to  the  value  in  period 
t-l  (i.e.,  'jt  =  (Vj  t  -  E(VjtjQt))/Vjt-l  where  Vjt  is  the  market  value 
of  firm  j  at  time  t).  3  Accordingly,  we  define  a  function  I(at),  which 
maps  new  information  at  time  t  onto  a  change  in  the  value  of  the  firm: 
I(@~)  =  V.  -  E(Vj&  . 
Jt 
The  new  information  at  time  t  is  at  =  6,  -  #t-l.  Suppose  Qt  has  two 
components  (9Rt,@&  and  these  two  components  have  separable  effects  on 
income,  i.e.,  Wt)  =  Il(@Rt>  +  lpPot>.  We wish  to  focus  on  @Rt  and 
compute  the  function  Il(@Rt).  In  our  interpretation  Il(QjRt)  is  a 
function  that  maps  new  information  relevant  to  international  loans  onto  the 
change  in  the  value  of  the  bank  stock.  Equation  (2)  can  be  rewritten  as: 
R.  =  RZt 
'l@Rt) 
Jt  +  pj  (Rmt-Rzt>  +  v 
jt-1  +  Ujt  (3) 
where  4 
"j  t  -  12(~ot)/Vjt-1  -  Emt' 
It  is  important  to  notice  in  equation  (3)  that  the  function  Il(aRt) 
deals  with  unexpected  changes  in  the  value  of  the  international  loans.  The 
expected,  or  systematic,  changes  in  the  loans'  value  have  already  been 
incorporated  into  the  stock  price  in  the  term  Bj  (Rmt-Rzt). 
Define  the  value  of  the  loan  as  ~(4,~).  It  has  two  risky  components, 
one  which  covaries  with  the  market  portfolio  and  another  which  does  not.  We 
can  calculate  these  components  from  the  equilibrium  rate  of  return  on  inter- 
national  loans,  r at'  The  equilibrium  rate  of  return  on  any  asset  is  the 
risk-free  rate  of  interest  plus  a  risk  premium  proportional  to  the  asset's 
systematic  risk: 
r at  =  RZt  +  BIWmt-Rzt)  (4) 6 
where  p I  is  the  systematic  risk  of  assets  representing  claims  on 
international  loans.  Knowing  rat  and  /3I,  W($&  can  be  thought  of  as  a 
weighted  average  of  its  two  risky  components.  The  nonsystematic  component 
is  ~(4~~)  Rzt/ratt  and  therefore  the  nonsystematic  change  in  the  value  of 
the  loan,  IpRt>  8  isAwR  /r  zt  at'  where  Aw =  ~(4~~)  -  w(d,,-,).  Hence 
equation  (3)  can  be  rewritten  as: 
R  zt  R.  -  Rzt  +  pj(Rmt-Rzt)  +  +  - 
Jt  jt-1  'at  +?t  ' 
(5) 
B.  The  Expected  Value  of  International  Loans 
The  mapping  function  Aw  has  been  defined  as  that  part  of  the  change 
in  the  value  of  the  bank  assets  associated  with  international  loans.  Since 
Aw  is  not  readily  available  as  data  we  need  to  compute  it  from  its  various 
components.  Futhermore,  data  on  loan  histories  are  not  available.  The 
timing,  amount  and  terms  of  rescheduling  agreements  are  available,  though  we 
do  not  generally  know  when  each  loan  was  originally  made  or  its  terms. 
Therefore,  computation  of  Aw  will  require  a  conceptualization  that  relies 
only  upon  available  data.  This  conceptual  design  is  now  described. 
Suppose  that  in  period  one  L/(l+r,)  is  lent  for  one  period.  The 
interest  on  international  loans  is  typically  a  base  rate  (usually  LIBOR) 
plus  a  spread.  Assuming  that  no  spread  is  charged  on  the  initial  loan, 
amount  L  becomes  due  in  period  two.  5  At  this  point  L  may  be  repaid  with 
probability  (1-P)  or  rescheduled  for  one  period  with  probability  P.  Define 
R  as  the  interest  rate  on  the  rescheduled  amount  L.  (R,  of  course,  must 
be  defined  for  given  future  probabilities  of  non-payment  of  the  rescheduled 
loan.)  The  expected  value  on  this  loan  contract  in  period  one  can  be 
expressed  as: 7 
R  PL  -  l+r  m 
where  r  is  also  the  discount  factor  for  the  lender.  Of  course  the 
m 
probabilities  of  rescheduling  P,  and  the  conditional  value  of 
reschedulings  LR  are  based  on  the  information  set  available  in  period  one. 
Generalizing,  the  expected  value  of  a  loan  outstanding  at  time  t  can 
be  expressed  as: 
co 
WuRt)  = c 




P  t+T(4Rt)  =  the  probability  that  a  rescheduling  agreement  is  made  in  the 
th  7  period  from  t  conditional  on  4  Rt' 
A  t+T(4Rt)  =  the  value  of  the  rescheduling  agreement  that  will  prevail  in 
the  7  th  period  from  t,  conditional  on  a  rescheduling 
agreement  occurring,  and  given  4  Rt  (i.e.  counterpart  of  RL 
above), 
r  =  discount  factor.  m 
By  utilizing  data  on  the  occurrence  of  reschedulings,  P  can  easily 
be  estimated.  A,  however,  still  needs  to  be  defined.  Without  loss  of 
generality,  we  take  the  parameters  of  the  rescheduled  loan  to  be  as 
follows:  the  loan  size,  L,  the  period  in  which  rescheduling  takes  place, 
t+7,  the  maturity,  M,  and  the  grace  period,  G,  during  which  only 
interest  is  paid.  Once  the  grace  period  ends,  the  principal  is  repaid  in 
equal  installments.  The  rate  of  interest,  r,  on  rescheduled  loans  is  the 
sumof  r m  and  s,  the  spread  determined  during  bilateral  negotiations. 8 
It  is  assumed  that  the  subsequent  probability  of  nonpayment  of  a 
rescheduled  loan,  7r,  is  the  same  for  each  period.  If  n=l  the  lender 
never  receives  a  payment.  The  expected  discounted  present  value  of  the 
rescheduling  transaction  can  be  expressed  as:  6 





[iiF]”  - [E-l” 
(M-G)  ' 
The  expression  [(1-r)/(rm+n)  -  l/r]  r  Q  gives  the  rate  of  return  from 
the  transaction  for  a  given  x  (i.e.  R  defined  in  the  one  period  example 
above).  Absence  of  data  on  ?r,  the  nonpayment  probability  of  the 
rescheduled  loan,  renders  it  difficult  to  calculate  A,  which  enters  as  the 
dependent  variable  in  the  estimation  of  the  conditional  value  of  the 
rescheduled  loan. 
To  circumvent  this  difficulty  we  first  assign  the  value  zero  to  the 
nonpayment  probability,  and  calculate  the  value  of  the  rescheduling 
agreement  using  this  value.  We then  demonstrate  how  n  is  calculated  from 
the  stock  returns.  We introduce  A',  the  value  of  the  rescheduling 
agreement  calculated  using  ?r -  0: 
A’ =  F 
[  1 
Q(n=O)  L  . 
m 
(8) 
Here,  (s/rm)  Q(r=O>  is  the  rate  of  profit  of  the  transaction  if  the 
rescheduled  loan  is  repaid  on  schedule.  7  Suppose  now  that  in  the  estimation 
of  the  conditional  value  which  enters  equation  (6),  A'  is  employed  as 9 
opposed  to  A.  With  this  assumption  w'  becomes  w. 
Finally,  the  change  in  the  value  of  the  rescheduled  loan  can  be 
estimated  by  using  w',  our  approximation  to  w: 
R. 
Jt  =  RZt  +  Pj(Rmt  -Rzt> 
AU' 
+  Au  7 
jt-1  +Yt  '  (9) 
where  X  is  the  coefficient  relating  the  accounting  value  AU'  to  the 
U 
economic  value  of  international  loans.  However,  this  specification  fails  to 
correct  for  the  systematic  component  of  AU'.  Following  equation  (5),  the 
specification  that  adjusts  for  systematic  risk  is: 
R 
R. 
Jt  =  RZt  +  pj  'Rmt -Rzt)  +  X  +  zt  +  u. 
jt-1  'at  Jt 
(9’) 
r at  =  RZt  +  B,  (Rmt-Rzt)  +  et 
The  parameter  X  measures  how  much  of  the  change  in  the  expected  account- 
ing  value  of  international  loans  is  capitalized  in  the  bank's  stock 
returns.  Now  X  (or  Au>  is  generally  not  unity  because  AU'  is 
calculated  under  the  assumption  that  rescheduled  loans  will  be  repaid  as 
contracted  upon.  To  the  extent  that  this  assumption  is  incorrect  the 
market  will  discount  for  it.  The  following  relations,  which  facilitate  the 
calculation  of  nonpayment  probabilities,  then  hold: 
Aw  =  XAw',  (10) 
and,  correspondingly: 
A=XA'  .  (11) 
Recall  that  A  is  incorporated  in  A  and  hence  in  w.  Employing  the 
estimated  value  of  X,  along  with  data  on  other  variables  relevant  to 10 
equation  (ll),  numerical  values  for  n  and  corresponding  confidence 
intervals  can  be  obtained.  If  the  result  of  this  estimation  is  X  =  1, 
then  7r =  0,  andif  X<l,  then  n>O. 
The  capitalized  fraction,  X,  is  of  interest  because  it  shows  how  the 
changes  in  expected  accounting  returns  translate  into  economic  returns. 
For  example,  X  <  0  implies  that  all  news  giving  positive  accounting 
returns  are  actually  economic  losses,  indicating  that  the  terms  of  resched- 
ulings  do  not  fully  compensate  for  the  nonpayment  probabilities  of 
rescheduled  loans. 
The  parameter  X  is  also  of  interest  because  it  provides  information 
on  the  competitiveness  and  efficiency  of  bank  lending.  In  a  competitive 
market  one  expects  excess  economic  returns  to  vanish.  If  O<X<l,  = 
however,  this  indicates  that  rescheduling  terms  are  such  that  the  lenders 
collect  rents  from  such  agreements.  This  could  be  explained  by  an  increase 
in  the  bargaining  power  of  banks  in  the  rescheduling  process.  If  X  is 
systematically  less  than  zero,  however,  this  would  suggest  inefficiency  in 
banks'  lending  decisions:  Since  the  terms  of  reschedulings  do  not  fully 
compensate  for  nonpayment  probabilities,  lenders  suffer  losses. 
III.  Estimation  and  Data  Description 
The  empirical  implementation  of  the  approach  is  carried  out  in  the 
following  two  stages. 
A.  Stage  One 
In  this  part  we  estimate  a  discrete  choice  model  of  the  rescheduling 
process  to  predict  rescheduling  probabilities.  Specifically,  let  Pt+7  -  1 
if  rescheduling  takes  place  in  the  7 th  period  from  t,  and  P 
t+7  =0  if 
it  does  not.  Assume  that  the  value  of  arranging  a  rescheduling  agreement 11 
acceptable  to  creditors  in  the  r th  period  from  t  is  given  by: 
(12) 
where 
4  Rt  =  the  information  set, 
pz+T  =  a  latent  variable  which  determines  the  occurrence  of  a 
rescheduling  agreement  with  country  i  in  the  7  th  period  from 
Et  =  a  normally  distributed  random  disturbance  term. 
Assuming  that  countries  act  in  their  own  best  interest, 
I 
0  if  P*  <O  t+r 
P  t+7  = 
1 
1  if  P2+7  2  0  , 
These  equations  describe  a  probit  model  for  the  probability  of  a  reschedul- 
ing  agreement  being  reached  in  the  7  th  period  from  t. 
Rescheduling  values  V'  are  estimated  by  employing  the  Heckman  (1976) 
two-step  procedure.  The  method  is  utilized  because  excluding  countries  that 
have  not  rescheduled  would  create  a  sample  selection  bias.  Accordingly, 
estimates  of  equation  (12)  are  used  to  construct  &&t/h  and  @(hRt/i), 
where  3  and  0  are,  respectively,  the  standard  normal  density  and 
distribution  functions,  and  the  following  equation  is  estimated: 
A'  d 
where  t+r  -  -f&t  +  71  5  +  I]t  (13) 
At+7  -  value  of  rescheduling  agreement  in  the  7  th  period  from  t  if  a 
rescheduling  agreement  takes  place  in  the  same  period  (i.e., 
P  t+r  =  I>, 12 
Ik/ll,  =  Mill's  ratio,  and 
%  =  normally  distributed  random  error  term. 
This  equation  is  estimated  using  only  the  observations  corresponding  to 
P  t+r  =  1,  by  ordinary  least  squares. 
An  important  issue  here  is  the  methodology  in  choosing  the 
specification  of  equations  (12)  and  (13).  It  is  difficult  on  theoretical 
grounds  to  exclude  any  information  at  time  t-l  as  a  useful  predictor  of  the 
occurrence  and  terms  of  a  rescheduling  agreement  in  time  t.  Economic  theory 
does  not  provide  much  guidance  on  which  variables  to  include.  The  "country 
risk"  literature,  however,  helps  to  indentify  variables  that  predict 
occurrence  of  reschedulings.  We borrow  the  variables  employed  in  the 
literature  on  country  risk  analysis  for  our  estimation  of  the  probabilities 
and  values  of  rescheduling  agreements.  In  this  study  four  types  of 
variables  are  employed.  Default  variables  incorporate  information  related 
to  the  failure  of  a  borrower  to  fulfill  a  prior  loan  contract.  Regional 
dummies  and  time  effects  have  also  been  incorporated.  Macroeconomic 
indicators  specific  to  the  countries  constitute  the  third  class  of 
variables.  The  fourth  type  consists  of  interactions  of  a  default  variable 
with  the  macro  indicators.  The  Appendix  provides  a  description  of  the 
variables  utilized. 
In  this  study  we  employ  monthly  data  for  48  countries  (see  Appendix) 
over  the  period  of  1975-83  and  information  on  bank  rescheduling  agreements 
for  the  1978-85  period.  For  purposes  of  estimation  we  utilize  forecast 
intervals,  7,  of  one  year:  one  set  of  equations  predicts  reschedulings 
that  take  place  between  t  and  t+12  (since  our  data  is  monthly),  a  second 
set  of  equations  predicts  reschedulings  which  take  place  between  t+12  and 
t+24,  and  so  forth.  8  A  similar  construction  applies  to  the  estimation  of 13 
A'.  These  estimating  equations  in  turn  are  used  to  make  predictions  of  the 
probabilities  of  reschedulings  and  the  conditional  values  employing  data  for 
1978-83  period,  the  period  for  which  the  second  stage  estimations  are 
conducted. 
B.  Stage  Two 
Estimates  from  part  one  are  employed  to  construct  AU',  our  measure  of 
the  changes  in  the  value  of  international  loans  resulting  from  new  informa- 
tion  at  time  t.  Our  estimation  of  equations  (12)  and  (13)  enables  us  to 
calculate  AU'  as  the  change  in  the  value  of  all  bank  loans  outstanding  to  a 
particular  country.  However,  in  investigating  the  bank  returns  we  would 
like  Aw'  to  be  a  bank  specific  measure.  It  should  reflect  the  change  in 
the  value  of  all  international  loans  that  are  relevant  for  the  particular 
bank.  By  employing  available  information  we  construct  such  measures.  9  Let 
this  measure  be  AU' jt' 
In  this  part,  we  assume  the  market  formed  expectations  according  to  the 
model  above,  and  estimate  how  much  of  Aw' 
jt 
is  capitalized  as  true  profits 
(losses)  in  the  stock  returns  of  the  commercial  banks  participating  in 
reschedulings.  10  For  this  purpose  we  employ  two  specifications,  equation 
(9)  or  (9').  11  This  methodology  is  analogous  to  the  two  step  procedure  used 
by  Barro  (1977,  1979)  and  others.  12 
Ideally  we  would  estimate  equation  (9)  or  (9')  using  data  on  the  risk- 
free  rate,  however,  it  is  not  observable.  In  many  studies,  Rzt  is  proxied 
simply  by  a  vector  of  Treasury  bill  rates  or  interest  rates  on  short-term 
high-grade  bonds.  We use  the  Treasury  bill  rate,  but  eliminate  inflation 
risk  (following  Gordon  and  Bradford  (1980))  by  setting  Rzt  =  K  +  HRft, 
where  Rft  is  the  Treasury  bill  rate.  p. 
J 
is  estimated  simultaneously  with 
the  other  parameters.  In  contrast,  the  standard  approach  is  to  estimate  p. 
J 14 
from  earlier  data  in  a  regression  of  the  form  R. 
Jt  -  Rft  =  pj  (R,t-Rft)  + 
ejt*  Then  i 
j 
would  be  used  as  an  independent  variable  in  estimating  (9) 
or  (9').  By  estimating  p. 
J 
simultaneously  with  equation  (9)  or  (9')  we 
avoid  any  inconsistency  or  bias  in  the  parameter  estimates  as  well  as 
increase  the  efficiency. 
The  specification  is  nonlinear  in  the  parameters  /3,  H,  and  K,  so 
nonlinear  estimation  techniques  are  employed.  If  it  is  assumed  that 
var(ejt)  =  of  and  cov(c.  it,ej7)  =  0  for  i  z  j  or  t  #  7,  then  nonlinear 
least  squares  estimation  is  appropriate.  The  assumption  of  cov(~~t,e.  )  - 
37 
0  for  tZ7  can  be  justified  on  the  grounds  of  rational  expectations.  If 
there  is  correlation  across  equations,  nonlinear  least  squares  estimates  of 
the  parameters  remain  consistent,  though  inefficient. 
R. 
Jt 
is  a  monthly  series  of  returns  to  the  securities  of  the  banks, 
compiled  at  the  Center  for  Research  in  Securities  Prices  (CRISP)  at  the 
University  of  Chicago.  Rmt  is  the  value-weighted-average  return  for  NYSE 
securities.  V. 
Jt 
is  a  monthly  series  of  values  of  total  outstanding  shares. 
The  price  and  share  series  used  in  the  calculation  of  V. 
Jt 
are  taken  from 
the  CRISP  tapes.  Monthly  data  for  January  1978-December  1983  have  been 
used.  The  sample  of  firms  includes  the  twenty-one  largest  U.S.  banks.  13 
IV.  Results 
Our  results  are  presented  in  two  parts.  The  first  part  contains  the 
estimates  which  permit  the  calculation  of  changes  in  the  expected  value  of 
international  loans  from  new  information.  We then  present  results 
concerning  the  fraction  of  these  changes  capitalized  in  bank  stock  returns. 
These  are  of  two  types,  one  uncorrected  for  systematic  risks  and  the  other 
corrected.  This  is  important,  because  when  developing  country  loans  have  a 15 
significant  systematic  risk,  failing  to  correct  for  them  yields  artifically 
high  returns.  Furthermore,  in  discussing  bank  stock  returns,  our  estimates 
for  the  1978-1980  and  1981-1983  periods  are  seperately  presented.  The 
entire  period  has  been  split  in  this  fashion  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  a 
structural  change  occurs  between  the  two  periods.  Many  indicators  suggest 
that  the  structure  of  bank  debt  may  have  been  altered  in  1981  by 
developments,  associated  with  the  onset  of  the  world  economic  downturn.  14 
The  results  of  our  first  stage  estimates  are  provided  in  the  Appendix. 
Table  A-l  contains  the  probit  estimates,  equation  (12)  and  A-2  contains  the 
value  estimates,  equation  (13).  The  estimation  of  equations  (12)  and  (13) 
do  not  constitute  the  primary  concern  and/or  contribution  of  this  paper,  so 
our  discussion  of  them  is  brief.  First,  variables  associated  with  past 
repayment  problems,  time  effects  and  regional  dummies  are  found  quite 
important  in  these  estimations.  Macroeconomic  indicators  are  also  found  to 
be  generally  consistent  with  prior  studies  in  the  country  risk  literature. 
Second,  additional  specifications  that  excluded  the  interactive  terms  and/or 
regional  dummies  and  time  effect  have  also  been  estimated.  The  direction 
and  significance  of  the  default  and  macro  variables  have  not  been  altered  in 
these  other  specifications.  The  specification  presented  in  the  Appendix, 
however,  has  superior  performance  in  terms  of  a  better  fit  of  the  equations. 
Furthermore,  our  second  stage  estimates  are  found  to  be  robust  to  such 
changes.  Third,  calculation  of  the  change  in  the  expected  value  of 
international  loans  from  new  information,  Aw,  is  based  on  these  estimates.  15 
Conceptually,  it  should  be  a  random  process,  and  Portmanteau  tests  indicate 
that  it  is.  16 
Our  discussion  of  the  second  stage  estimate  will  focus  on  the 
parameters  that  measure  the  impact  of  reschedulings  on  bank  returns.  These 16 
are  X  or 
U  X,  the  uncorrected  and  corrected  values  of  the  capitalized 
fraction,  respectively.  (Estimates  of  other  parameters  are  presented  in 
Tables  A-3  and  A-4  in  the  Appendix). 
Estimates  and  standard  errors  of  Xu  from  equation  (9)  for  the  largest 
nine  and  the  next  largest.twelve  banks  are  presented  separately  in  Table  1. 
Since  the  larger  banks  have  a  greater  exposure  to  foreign  loans, 
rescheduling  would  be  expected  to  have  a  more  substantial  impact  on  their 
security  prices.  17  Similar  results  hold  however  for  the  entire  sample  of 
banks.  18  These  results  indicate  that  the  stock  returns  of  the  top  nine 
banks  increased  by  26  percent  due  to  loan  reschedulings  and  the  returns  of 
the  next  twelve  banks  increased  by  8.9  percent  during  1978-1983.  Table  1 
also  presents  the  estimates  of  X 
U  for  the  1978-80  and  1981-83  periods 
separately.  Xu  is  negative  but  not  statistically  significant  at  the  5 
percent  level  of  significance  in  the  earlier  period.  Xu,  however  is 
positive  and  statistically  significant  in  the  later  period.  The  95 
percent  confidence  intervals  for  the  nine-bank  Xu  are  as  follows: 
1978-1980  -.43  <  Au  5  .174  = 
1981-1983  .186<X  c.381  =  us 
These  confidence  intervals  show  that  there  is  a  clear  difference  between  the 
two  periods.  In  fact,  using  Chow  tests  we  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
relationship  (9)  is  stable  across  the  two  subperiods  for  each  of  the  bank 
19  groups. 
Employing  the  estimated  values  of  Xu  along  with  other  data  on 
rescheduling  terms,  an  estimate  of  the  market's  perception  of  the  probabil- 
ity  of  nonpayment  for  the  rescheduled  loans  can  be  calculated.  As  explained 
before,  we  have  calculated  expected  loan  values  on  the  assumption  that 
rescheduled  loans  will  be  repaid.  To  the  extent  that  this  assumption  is  not 17 
TABLE  1 
Impact  of  Reschedulings  on  Bank  Returns 
Estimated  equation:  (9). 
Nine  Banks  1978-1983  1978-1980  1981-1983 
Au  .26  -.13  .28 
(.04)  (-15)  (.04) 
7r  .018  .0124 
(.0024)  (.0007) 





-.23  .ll 
(.13)  (.04) 
.0197  .01514 
(.00196)  (.00071) 
Xu  for  nine  banks  estimated  with  yearly  breakpoints: 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
.088  .13  .17  .21  .255 




valid  we  expect  Xu  to  reflect  it.  In  solving  for  A,  (using  equation 
(11))  we  employ  the  period's  average  values  on  rescheduling  variables.  20 
According  to  these  calculations,  for  the  nine  bank  group,  the 
market  perceived  a  .018  probability  of  nonpayment  of  rescheduled  loans  in 
the  1978-80  period.  At  the  same  time,  the  spreads  charged  in  reschedulings 
were  not  high  enough  to  compensate  for  this  risk.  Hence,  Xu  is  negative, 
yet  the  difference  between  this  estimate  and  zero  is  not  statistically 
significant.  In  the  1981-83  period  the  probability  of  nonpayment  for 
rescheduled  loans  was  viewed  as  approximately  .012.  The  estimated  value  for 
?I  suggests  that  the  terms  of  rescheduled  loans  were  more  than  enough  to 
compensate  for  nonpayment  risk,  and  that  28  percent  of  the  accounting 
returns  were  capitalized  as  economic  returns.  Similar  results  hold  for  the 
twelve  bank  group,  as  presented  in  Table  1. 
This  specification  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  X  remains 
U 
constant  (and,  therefore,  that  the  nonpayment  probabilities  are  constant) 
throughout  each  three  year  period.  Such  an  assumption  is,  however,  not 
supported  by  the  data.  This  is  clear  from  the  estimation  of  Xu  as  a 
piecewise  linear  function  of  time  (with  breakpoints  at  every  year)  over  the 
whole  sample  period  of  six  years.  The  implied  values  of  Au  and  standard 
errors  at  yearly  breakpoints  are  presented  in  Table  1,  in  which  it  is  clear 
that  the  fraction  of  changes  in  value  capitalized  as  economic  profits 
increased  steadily  between  1978  and  1983.  Correspondingly,  the  nonpayment 
probability  declines. 
These  results,  however,  could  arise  from  artifacts  associated  with 
not  correcting  for  the  systematic  risks  of  the  rescheduled  assets.  In  the 
event  that  such  risks  are  significant  the  positive  returns  above  could  be 
merely  for  compensation. 19 
Table  2  presents  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  equation  (9'), 
which  corrects  for  the  systematic  risks.  These  results  are  quite  different 
from  the  results  in  Table  1.  X  for  the  nine  banks  is  negative  and 
statistically  significant  for  the  1978-1983  period  as  a  whole.  Estimations 
conducted  for  the  1978-1980  and  1981-1983  periods  separately  are  also 
presented  in  Table  2.  In  the  earlier  period  the  assets  of  banks  have  not 
been  revalued  significantly  in  response  to  news  on  reschedulings.  In  the 
later  period,  however,  the  estimated  decline  in  the  stock  returns  of  the 
nine  banks  is  8.2  percent.  The  corresponding  probability  of  nonpayment  of 
rescheduled  loans  is  calculated  to  be  approximately  .019  for  the  1981-1983 
period.  Implied  yearly  values  of  X  from  its  estimation  as  a  piecewise 
linear  function  of  time,  however,  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero. 
The  twelve-group,  on  the  other  hand,  lost  1.3  percent  during  1981-1983. 
(This  group  also  is  estimated  to  have  gained  8.4  percent  in  their  stock 
returns  during  1978-1980,  but  this  result  is  statistically  insignificant.) 
Overall,  empirical  results  of  this  section  indicate  that  market 
value  of  the  largest  nine  U.S.  banks  were  not  significantly  altered  by 
reschedulings  in  the  1978-1980  period.  In  the  1981-1983  period,  however, 
market  values  of  less  developed  country  loans  declined.  Our  results  also 
indicate  that  there  is  a  significant  non-diversifiable  risk  associated  with 
these  loans.  Hence,  if  estimates  are  conducted  without  taking  this  into 
account,  it  is  possible  to  reach  quite  misleading  findings.  The  results  are 
also  interesting  in  pointing  out  a  difference  between  the  nine-  and  twelve- 
bank  groups.  The  impact  on  the  latter  group  is  estimated  to  be  less 
detrimental.  Analysis  of  the  interaction  among  the  different  classes  of 
lenders  in  the  literature  is  scarce.  But  it  has  been  suggested  that,  during 
reschedulings,  smaller  banks  free-ride  on  the  larger  banks  which  have 20 
TABLE  2 
Impact  of  Reschedulings  on  Bank  Returns 
Estimated  equation:  (9') 
Nine  Banks  1978-1983  1978  - 1980  1981-1983 
x  -.06  -.11  -.082 
(.03)  (.13)  (.041) 
?r  .0177  .0188 
(.00211)  (.00074) 














1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
-.162  -.138  -.114  -.09  -.066  -.042 
C.10)  (.105)  (.118)  C.11)  (-14)  (.15) 21 
greater  exposure.  Our  results  from  the  1981-1983  period  are  supportive  of 
this  hypothesis. 
v.  Conclusion 
In  this  article  we  have  developed  and  implemented  a  method  of 
analysis  to  investigate  the  response  of  bank  stock  prices  to  news  pertaining 
to  international  loans.  This  method  is  an  improvement  upon  the  standard 
event  study  methodology  in  that  it  allows  for  both  the  formation  of 
expectations  and  the  investigation  of  stock  price  response  to  the  updating 
of  such  expectations.  Upon  implementation,  we  have  been  able  to  calculate 
the  nonpayment  probabilities  of  rescheduled  loans  and  the  fraction  of  the 
changes  in  expected  accounting  value  of  international  loans  that  are 
transformed  into  economic  value. 
Our  findings  indicate  that  stock  returns  of  large  U.S.  banks  were 
not  significantly  affected  in  the  years  1978-80;  however,  they  declined  by 
8.2  percent  during  1981-1983.  The  results  for  the  later  period  can  be 
compared  with  those  of  previous  studies  which  used  different  methodologies. 
For  example,  the  market  value  of  62  large  U.S.  banks  has  been  estimated 
(Kyle  and  Sachs  (1984))  to  have  declined  12.8  percent  because  of  their 
exposure  to  Latin  American  countries.  21  Bzler  (1986)  used  a  standard  event 
study  methodology  to  find  that  non-payments  of  international  loans  on  a 
timely  basis  caused  a  3.3  percent  decline  in  the  stock  returns  of  the  nine 
largest  banks.  22  Despite  the  difference  in  specific  values  obtained  from 
various  methodologies,  reschedulings  are  found  to  have  had  a  definite 
negative  impact  during  the  period.  The  improved  methodology  presented  here 
is  expected  to  yield  the  most  accurate  measurements. 
Unlike  past  methodologies,  our  method  permits  the  estimation  of  the 22 
systematic  risk  component  of  these  loans  as  well,  and  this  component  is 
found  to  be  very  significant.  Furthermore,  we  calculate  that  the 
probability  of  nonpayment  of  rescheduled  loans  is  approximately  two  percent 
during  the  entire  period.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  negative  revaluation  of 
bank  assets  is  associated  with  large  losses  that  would 
event  that  a  small  probability  hazard  is  experienced. 
possibility  of  numerous  major  borrowers  rescheduling  si 
be  incurred  in  the 
In  particular,  the 
multaneously,  perhaps 
in  response  to  external,  worldwide  shocks,  would  explain  such  negative 
revaluation. 
The  implication  of  our  results  for  bank  management  and  regulation  is 
of  particular  interest.  The  fact  that  there  was  indeed  a  penalty  in  the 
marketplace  for  participating  in  developing  country  loans  that  were  being 
rescheduled,  demonstrates  the  existence  of  built-in  disincentives  to 
continue  such  lending.  This  is  evidenced  in  the  sharp  decline  of  the  bank 
lending  growth  to  7  percent  in  1983  and  to  3  percent  in  1984  from  previous 
levels  of  15-30  percent  per  year  during  1977-1980.  It  is  not  so  clear 
however  why  this  effect  was  not  operative  in  the  earlier  years  until  the 
experience  of  the  Mexican  crisis.  Our  findings  confirm  that  further 
analysis  of  the  emergence  of  the  bank  lending  market  to  LDCs  is  an  important 
avenue  of  research. 
The  results  and  methodology  of  this  article  assume  continued 
importance  in  the  present  environment,  when  such  major  troubled  borrowers  as 
Brazil  and  Argentina  face  more  reschedulings.  Our  methods  should  be  useful 
for  an  improved  assessment  of  market  value  of  banks'  international  loans  and 
hence  the  future  credit  worthiness  of  borrower  countries. 23 
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1  This  figure  was  165%  in  1978  and  181.4%  in  1983,  as  reported  in  IMF 
(1986). 
2$28  billion  of  this  consists  of  short-term  debt  rolled  over  or 
converted  into  medium-term  loans  (IMF  (1985)). 
3  Fama  (1976)  describes  capital  markets  as  efficient  if  the  market 
capitalizes  the  true  expected  value  of  capital  assets.  The  result  follows 
given  the  assumption  of  E(Rjtldt)  -  R. 
Jt  -  'jt' 
and  the  definition  of  the 
equilibrium  market  value  of  the  firm: 
E(Vjtl't)  -  'jt-l+d 
E(Rjtl~t)  = 
jt 
V  t 
jt-1 
where  V 
jt 
is  the  market  value  of  firm  j  at  time  t  and  d.  are 
Jt 
dividends  (which  are  assumed  to  be  certain),  and  the  other  variables  are  as 
described  in  equation  (1). 
4  For  consistent  estimates  of  equation  (3)  Rmt  must  not  be  correlated 
with  E 
mt  and  Il(aRt)  must  be  independent  of  E  mt  and  12(@ot). 
5  This  obviously  is  not  an  accurate  assumption.  But  with  this  method 
we  at  least  know  the  direction  of  the  error.  In  comparing  rescheduled  loans 
to  original  loans,  our  method  provides  larger  differences  in  accounting 
values.  Given  the  paucity  of  data,  however,  other  possible  interest  rates 24 
are  more  likely  to  contaminate  the  results  further. 
6  For  a  more  accurate  formulation  of  the  value  of  rescheduling,  fees 
paid  to  the  lenders  should  be  included.  However  complete  data  is  not  avail- 
able  on  the  rescheduling  fees  charged  on  loans  between  1978  and  1983.  Under 
the  assumptions  stated  A  is  defined  as  follows: 
l+r(M+l-t+r)  1-n  t+7 
t+T=G+l  (M-G)  I[  I  l+r  m 
-L 
I 
-l+r  l 
t+;,[!z.]f+r  +  [qG  ,y;E,  P+y-f-$-t+~)  I  k  t+r  [II 
In  deriving  equation  (7)  from  this  expression  we  made  use  of  the  following: 
(i>  Geometric  progression  sum  rule: 
G  1-n  t+r 
Ix  - 
t+r=l  [  I  l+r  m  -+z  [l  -  [kgG]f 
(ii) 
M-G  t+r 
I:  (M-G+l-t)  e  =  1-?r  [  I 
M-G  1  ?r  t+r 
- (n+rm) 
c- 
t+7=1  m  t+7=1  [  I  l+r  -  (M-G) 
m 
where  (M-G)  is  an  integer. 
7  Feder  and  Ross  (1982)  employ  the  same  accounting  definition  of 
rescheduled  loans  and  derive  the  equivalent  of  A’. 
8  Theoretically,  an  infinite  number  of  forecast  intervals  should  be 
employed.  Due  to  data  constraints  four  forecast  intervals  have  been 
constructed. 
9  In  this  construction  we  assume  that  banks'  contribution  to  relief 
programs  has  been  proportional  to  their  exposure  to  individual  countries. 
Due  to  paucity  of  public  information  through  out  the  period,  however,  we 
used  proxies.  These  proxies  have  been  constructed  employing  Fed.  Country 
Exposure  Lending  Survey  and  Compustat  tapes.  The  former  provides  data  on 25 
amounts  owed  to  groups  of  banks  (i.e.  top  nine,  next  15  etc.)  by  each 
country.  For  further  breakdown  within  each  group  we  relied  on  Bank 
Compustat  tapes  and  employed  information  pertaining  foreign  branch  loan  of 
each  bank. 
10  The  estimates  of  X  and  Xu,  will  be  subject  to  bias  towards  zero 
to  the  extent  that  Aw' 
jt 
contains  measurement  error. 
11In  the  empirical  implementation  of  (9'),  ft  is  employed  as  a 
measure  of  r  :  at 
ft  = 




rt  is  the  spread  charged  on  the  rescheduled  loan  at  time  t,  rt  = 
the  average  market  spread  on  LDC  loans  at  time  t,  LF  =  the  face  value  of 
rescheduled  loans  at  time  t,  Lt  =  total  outstanding  loans  to  LDC's  at  time 
t.  Equations  in  (9')  are  estimated  simultaneously  by  constraining  PI  and 
X  to  be  the  same  in  both. 
12  This  methodology  will  yield  consistent  parameter  estimates. 
However  it  can  lead  to  inappropriate  inference.  This  two  step  procedure 
implicitely  assumes  that  there  is  no  uncertainty  in  the  estimates  of  AU'. 
Jt' 
As  a  consequence  the  estimates  of  the  standard  errors  of  the  parameters  are 
inconsistent.  (See  Mishkin  (1983)  for  further  discussion  and  references). 
13  The  top  nine  U.S.  banks  are:  Bank  of  America,  Citicorp,  Chase 
Manhattan,  Manufacturers  Hanover  Corp.,  Morgan  (J.P.)  &  Co.,  Chemical  N.Y., 
Continental  Illinois,  Bankers  Trust  New York  Corp.,  First  Chicago  Corp. 
Following  are  the  twelve  banks  that  are  in  our  sample  (these  banks  are  in 
Fed  (E.16)  "next  fifteen  largest  banks"  category  and  their  stocks  are 
exchanged  in  the  NYSE.):  Wells  Fargo  &  Co.,  Irving  Bank  Co.,  Cracker 26 
National  Co.,  Marine  Midland  Banks  Inc.,  Bank  of  Boston  Corp.,  Northwestern 
Corp.,  Interfirst  Corp.,  Republic  Bank  Corp.,  NBD Bancorp.  Tex.,  Texas  Comm. 
Bankshares  Inc.. 
14  Because  of  the  recession  in  the  developed  countries,  LDCs 
experienced  a  significant  deterioration  in  terms  of  trade  and  stagnation  in 
the  volume  of  real  exports.  Real  interest  rates  increased  from  -0.8  percent 
(the  average  for  1970-80)  to  11  percent  in  1982.  It  has  been  argued  that 
these  developments  contributed  to  the  unwillingness  and/or  inability  to  pay 
of  the  borrowers,  which  in  turn  altered  the  value  of  outstanding  bank  assets 
(Ozler  1986). 
15  The  mean  of  Aa  during  the  72  month  period  under  consideration  is 
249.5  million  dollars  for  the  nine  largest  banks.  Standard  error  is  880.1. 
16  For  example,  the  Q  statistic  calculated  from  the 
autocorrelations  check  are  15.23,  16.31  and  17.66  for  12,  18  and  24  lags 
respectively.  The  critical  chi-squared  at  the  5% level  are  21.05,  28.86, 
36.41  at  12,  18  and  24  degress  of  freedom  respectively. 
17  The  largest  nine  U.S.  banks'  exposure  to  Eastern  Europe,  non-oil 
developing  countries,  and  noncapital-surplus  OPEC countries  reached  nearly 
U.S.  300% of  capital  in  1982-83  while  the  same  figure  is  about  200%  for  all 
banks.  Approximately  two-thirds  of  this  debt  has  been  subject  to  debt 
service  interruption  (Cline  1984,  p.  26). 
18  The  asymptotic  F-statistics  for  the  Chow  test  for  the  stabil 
coefficients  across  nine  and  twelve  bank  groups  for  equation  9  are  as 
follows:  for  1978-1983,  F(24,1485)  =  0.38,  for  1978-1980,  F(24,729)  - 
and  for  1981-1983,  F(24,729)  -  .254  which  are  clearly  lower  than  the 
appropriate  F  -  table  values  at  5%. 
19 
ity  of 
.117 
--The  Chow  tests  for  the  stability  of  equation  (9)  across  1978-1980 27 
and  1981-1983  periods  produce  the  following  F-statistics  for  the  nine  bank 
and  twelve  bank  groups  respectively:  F(12,624)  =  1.86  and  F(15,834)  =  2.72. 
The  critical  F  values  at  5% level  of  confidence  are  1.75  and  1.67 
respectively. 
20  Average  values  during  1978-1980  for  rm(Libor),  r,  G and  M are: 
0.118,  0.136,  1.75,  4.4,  respectively.  For  1981-1983  the  corresponding 
values  are:  0.31,  0.151,  2.9,  6.5  respectively. 
between  the  last  quarter 
22  The  same  study 
period.  The  difference  in  these  two  results  is  important  in  pointing  out 
21  This  result  is  from  a  pooled  regression  estimated  for  the  period 
of  1982  and  the  third  quarter  of  1983. 
finds  a  positive  significant  impact  for  the  earlier 
the  differences  between  the  two  methodologies.  For  example,  if  the  news  in 
the  market  prior  to  the  nonpayment  announcement  generated  expectations  of 
large  losses,  but  the  actual  default  announcement  revealed  information  that 
the  projected  losses  were  exaggerated  the  default  announcement  would  have  a 
positive  coefficient  estimate. 28 
APPENDIX 
Variables  and  Data  Sources  for  the  First  Stage  Estimates 
The  following  abbreviations  are  used  for  data  sources: 
ERP  -  Economic  Report  of  the  President 
IFS,IMF  -  International  Financial  Statistics  (tape) 
WDT  -  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables 
Dependent  Variables 
The  dates  and  the  terms  of  bank  debt  reschedulings  are  obtained  from 
IMF  (1986). 
Indenendent  Variables 
1)  Default  variables: 
DEF24:  (A  dummy variable  that  becomes  one  if  the  borrower  has 
failed  to  comply  with  a  bank  loan  contract  in  the  past  24  months,  zero 
otherwise)  This  data  has  been  collected  by  the  author  through  search  of 
financial  press,  and  is  available  upon  request. 
IMG6.  -*  (A  dummy variable  that  becomes  one  if  the  borrower  has 
reached  a  conditionality  agreement  with  the  IMF  or  rescheduled  loans  with 
official  lenders)  The  IMF  standby  Agreements  and  the  use  of  the  IMF 
Extended  Fund  Facility  are  obtained  from  IMF  Annual  Reports.  Data  on 
official  Loan  reschedulings  is  obtained  from  IMF  (1984a). 
TDEF:  (Time  since  default  indicates  the  number  of  months  passed  -- 
up  to  24  months  --  without  the  signing  of  a  rescheduling  agreement  since 
default) 
2)  Time  and  regional  affects 
TIME:  (Monthly  time  indicator  which  takes  the  value  of  1  in  the 
first  month). 
m:  (A  dummy variable  that  becomes  one  for  African  countries). 29 
&YJ:  (A  dummy variable  that  is  one  for  countries  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere). 
3)  Macroeconomic  Indicators 
m:  (Debt  service  divided  by  exports).  Debt  service  is  obtained 
from  WDT,  and  exports  is  obtained  from  IFS. 
pJ+I:  (Total  official  reserves  minus  gold  divided  by  imports).  Both 
variables  are  from  IFS. 
m:  (Exports  over  GNP)  Exports  in  U.S.  dollars  is  obtained  from 
IFS.  For  GNP see  below. 
GNP:  (Real  per  capita  gross  national  product)  Gross  national 
product  in  U.S.  dollars  taken  from  WDT,  is  converted  to  real  1972  dollars 
using  the  U.S.  GNP deflator  from  ERP. 
TDX.  --  (Total  debt  divided  by  exports)  Total  debt  is  from  WDT.  It 
is  the  sum  of  total  disbursed  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  medium  and  long 
term  debt,  and  total  disbursed  private  medium  and  long  term  debt.  For 
exports  see  above. 
m:  (Real  Gross  national  product  growth) 
ppp:  (Purchasing  Power  Parity)  It  has  been  calculated  as  the 
difference  between  the  domestic  and  U.S.  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  infla- 
tion  rates  and  less  the  rate  of  domestic  currency  depreciation  vis-a-vis  the 
U.S.  dollar.  All  the  relevant  variables  are  constructed  from  IFS. 
RED*  -*  (The  real  Eurodollar  rate)  The  end-of-year  1  year  Eurodollar 
deposit  rate  r m  from  WFM is  adjusted  using  domestic  CPI  inflation  i)  and 
the  rate  of  exchange  rate  depreciation  (both  from  IFS)  to  yield 
RED = 




















Countries  Included  In  The  Analvsis 
(Based  on  IMF  classification) 
Non-Oil  Developing  Countries 
Africa  Western  Hemisnhere 
Burundi  Argentina 
Cameroon  Bolivia 
Ethiopia  Brazil 
Ivory  Coast  Chile 
Kenya  Colombia 
Liberia  Costa  Rica 
Malawi  Dominican  Republic 
Mauritania  Ecuador 
Mauritius  El  Salvador 
Morocco  Honduras 
Sudan  Jamaica 
Tunisia  Mexico 
Panama 
Middle  East  Paraguay 
Egypt  Peru 
Israel  Uruguay 
Venezuela 
















Probability  of  Reschedulings 
Equation  (12):  Probit  Estimation 
(numbers  in  parentheses  are  standard  errors) 

































































































































1st  Forecast 
interval 
-2.97 



















2nd  Forecast  3rd  Forecast 

































863.66  992.93 



















aThe  variables  that  take  the  DF  prefix  are  constructed  by  interacting  the 
default  dummy with  the  macro  variables  represented  after  the  DF  prefix. 33 
TABLE  A-2 
Conditional  Value  of  Reschedulings 
Equation  (13):  OLS Estimationa 
(numbers  in  the  parentheses  are  standard  errors) 




























































1st  Forecast 
interval 






































































































































































aThe  dependent  variable  employed  is  the  value  of  rescheduling  as  described 
in  equation  (8)  divided  by  the  total  debt  of  the  country.  In  the 
construction  of  AU',  however,  the  forecasted  variable  obtained  from  this 
estimation  is  multiplied  by  the  total  debt  of  the  country. 
b Same as  (a)  of  Table  A-l. 
CThe  inverse  of  Mill's  ratio. 35 
TABLE  A-3 
Returns  Equation  for  the  Top  Nine  Banksa 
Equation  (9):  Non-linear 
Least  Squares 
Equation  (9'):  System  of 
Non-linear  Least  Squares 


















































































Table  A-2  (cont.) 
Parameter  1978-1980  1981-1983  1978-1980 
r39  1.03  .99  .98 
(.19)  (-15)  l.16) 
K  -.004  -.16  -.08 
(.006)  C.01)  (.03) 
H  7.94  10.93  10.47 
(1.39)  (3.90)  (4.8) 
R2  .26  .36  .26 
aRzt  of  equation  (9)  and  (9')  is  specified  as  K+H  Rft. 










Returns  Equation  for  the  Next  Twelve  Banksa 







( *  19) 
.007 












































































































TABLE  A-3  (cont.) 
Parameter  1978-1980 
B21  .64 
(.17) 
K  -.08 
(.003) 
H  11.42 
(1.16) 

























aAs  stated  in  section  III-B  above,  R 
specified  to  be  K  +  H  Rft. 
zt  of  these  equations  (9)  and  (9')  is 
,!?'s  of  banks  lo-20  are  measured  relative  to  bank  21. 39 
References 
Barro,  Robert,  "Unanticipated  Money  Growth  and  Unemployment  in  the  United 
States,"  American  Economic  Review,  March  1977,  67,  101-115. 
"Unanticipated  Money,  Output, 
States,:' 
and  the  Price  Level  in  the  United 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  August  1978,  86,  549-580. 
Black,  Fischer.,  "Capital  Market  Equilibrium  with  Restricted  Borrowing," 
Journal  of  Business,  July  1972,  45,  445-455. 
Bowman,  Robert,  "Understanding  and  Conducting  Event  Studies,"  Journal  of 
Business  Finance  and  Accounting,  April  1983,  10,  561-583. 
Bruner,  Robert  and  Simms,  Jr.  John,  "The  International  Debt  Crisis  and  Bank 
Security  Returns  in  1982,"  Journal  of  Money.  Credit.  and  Banking, 
February  1987,  19,  46-55. 
Cline,  William,  International  Debt  Systematic  Risk  and  Policv  Response, 
Washington:  'Institute  for  International  Economics,  1984. 
Cornell,  Bradford,  and  Shapiro,  Alan,  "The  Reaction  of  Bank  Stock  Prices  to 
the  International  Debt  Crisis",  Journal  of  Banking  and  Finance,  March 
1986,  10,  55-73. 
Eaton,  Jonathan  and  Mark  Gersovitz,  "Debt  with  Potential  Repudiation: 
Theoretical  and  Empirical  Analysis,"  Review  of  Economic  Studies,  April 
1981,  48,  289-309. 
and  Lance,  Taylor,  "Developing  Country  Finance  and  Debt,"  Journal 
of  Develooment  Economics,  June  1986,  22,  209-265. 
Edwards,  Sebastian,  "LDC's  Foreign  Borrowing  and  Default  Risk:  An  Empirical 
Investigation  1976-1980,"  American  Economic  Review,  September  1984,  74, 
726-734. 
Fama,  Eugene  F.,  "Efficient  Capital  Markets:  A  Review  of  Theory  and 
Empirical  Work,"  Journal  of  Finance,  May  1970,  25,  383-417. 
,  Foundations  of  Finance,  New York:  Basic  Books,  1976. 
Feder,  Gershon  and  Just,  Richard,  "A  Study  of  Debt-Servicing  Capacity 
Applying  Logit  Analysis,"  Journal  of  Development  Economics,  March  1977,  4, 
25-38. 
and  "An  Analysis  of  Credit  Terms  in  the  Eurodollar 
Market,"  Euronean  Economic  Review,  May  1977,  9,  221-243. 
and  Ross,  Knud,  "Risk  Assessments  and  Risk  Premiums  in  the 
Eurodollar  Market,"  Journal  of  Finance,  June  1982,  37,  679-692. 
Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination 
Council,  various  issues. 40 
Frank,  Charles  and  Cline,  William,  "Measurement  of  Debt  Servicing  Capacity," 
Journal  of  International  Economics,  August  1971,  1,  327-344. 
Gersovitz,  Mark,  "Banks'  International  Lending  Decisions:  What  Do  We Know, 
Implications  for  Future  Research,"  in  G.  Smith,  J.  Cuddington  (eds.) 
International  Debt  and  DeveloDinz  Countries,  Washington,  DC:  World  Bank, 
1985. 
Gordon,  Roger,  and  Bradford,  David,  "Taxation  and  the  Stock  Market  Valuation 
of  Capital  Gains  and  Dividends,"  Journal  of  Public  Economics,  October 
1980,  14,  109-135. 
Guttentag,  Jack  and  Herring,  Richard,  "Commercial  Bank  Lending  to  Developing 
Countries:  From  Overlending  to  Underlending  to  Structural  Reform,"  the 
Wharton  Program  in  International  Banking  and  Finance  Working  Paper,  1984. 
Hajivassiliou,  Vassilis,  "Analyzing  the  Determinants  of  the  External  Debt 
Repayments  Problems  of  LDCs:  Estimation  Using  a  Panel  Set  of  Data," 
Department  of  Economics,  MIT,  1984. 
Heckman,  James,  "The  Common Structure  of  Statistical  Models  of  Truncation, 
Sample  Selection  and  Limited  Dependent  Variables  and  Simple  Estimators 
for  Such  Models,"  Annals  of  Economic  and  Social  Measurement,  Fall  1976, 
5,  475-492. 
International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook, 
Washington,  DC.,  1984. 
,  Recent  DeveloDments  in  External  Debt  Restructuring,  Washington, 
DC:  IMF  Occasional  Paper  No.  40,  1985. 
,  International  Capital  Markets:  Developments  and  Prospects, 
Washington,  DC:  IMF  Occasional  Paper  No.  43,  1986. 
,  Annual  ReDort,  various  issues,  Washington,  DC. 
Kharas,  Homi  J.,  "The  Long-run  Creditworthiness  of  Developing  Countries: 
Theory  and  Practice,"  Ouarterlv  Journal  of  Economics,  August  1984,  99, 
415-432. 
Kyle,  Steven,  and  Sachs,  Jeffrey,  "Developing  Country  Debt  and  the  Market 
Value  of  Large  Commercial  Banks,"  NBER Working  Paper  No.  1470,  September 
1984. 
Leiderman,  Leonardo,  "Macroeconometric  Testing  of  the  Rational  Expectations 
and  Structural  Neutrality  Hypothesis  for  the  United  States",  Journal  of 
Monetary  Economics,  January  1980,  6,  69-82. 
McDonald,  Donogh,  "Debt  Capacity  and  Developing  Country  Borrowing,"  IMF 
Staff  Paper  No.  29,  December  1982,  29,  603-46. 41 
McFadden,  D.,  Richard,  E.,  Gerhard,  F.,  Hajivasiliou,  V.,  and  O'Connell,  S., 
"IS  There  Life  After  Debt?  An  Econometric  Analysis  of  Credit  Worthiness 
of  Developing  Countries,"  paper  presented  at  the  Conference  on 
International  Debt  and  the  Developing  Countries,  Washington,  DC:  World 
Bank,  1984. 
Mishkin,  Frederic,  "Monetary  Policy  and  Long-Term  Interest  Rates:  An 
Efficient  Markets  Approach",  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  January  1981, 
7,  29-55. 
,  A  Rational  Exnectations  Annroach  to  Macroeconometrics:  Testing 
Policy  Ineffectiveness  and  Efficient-Markets  Models,  Chicago:  The 
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1983. 
bzler,  Sule,  "The  Motives  for  International  Bank  Debt  Rescheduling,  1978-83: 
Theory  and  Evidence,"  UCLA  Dept.  of  Economics  Working  Paper  No.  401,  1986. 
Sachs,  Jeffrey  and  Cohen,  Daniel,  "LDC  Borrowing  with  Default  Risk,"  Kredit 
und  Kanitol,  forthcoming. 
and  Cooper,  Richard,  "Borrowing  Abroad:  The  Debtors 
Perspective,"  in  Smith  G.,  Cuddington  J.  (eds.)  International  Debt  and 
Developing  Countries,  Washington,  DC,  World  Bank,  1985. 
Saini,  Krishan  and  Bates,  Philip,  "Statistical  Techniques  for  Determining 
Debt-Servicing  Capacity  for  Developing  Countries:  Analytical  Review  of 
the  Literature  and  Further  Empirical  Results,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New York  Research  Paper  No.  7818,  1978. 
Sargen,  Nicholas,  "Use  of  Economic  Indicators  and  Country  Risk  Appraisal," 
Economic  Review  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  San  Francisco,  Fall  1977. 
Schoder,  Stewart  and  Prashant  Vankudre,  "The  Market  for  Bank  Stock  and 
Banks'  Disclosure  of  Cross-Border  Exposure:  The  1982  Mexican  Debt 
Crisis",  Working  Paper,  Wharton  School  of  Finance,  University  of 
Pennyslvania,  1986. 
World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables,  Washington,  DC.,  1985. 